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The Case for Black Reparations. By Boris I. Bittker. New York: Ran-
dom House, 1973. Pp. 191 (including two appendices). $7.95 (cloth-
bound), $1.95 (paperback).
Reviewed by Ewart Guiniert
James Forman burst into the Riverside Church in New York City in
1969 and demanded that white churches, Jewish synagogues, "and all
other racist institutions" pay reparations to blacks for the wrongs done
by America to slaves and the children of slaves.' Boris Bittker heard
and listened, and was moved to write this book.2 The compleat lawyer,
he removes the question of reparations from the black ghetto and sub-
jects it to scholarly legal analysis. He discovers, first, that the notion
of reparations is not "bizarre" but reasonable,: and second, that it is
replete with what he portrays as nearly insurmountable problems.' He
closes with a prayer for a national debate on the question.5
Reparations, as Professor Bittker uses the term, are an attempt to
redress injuries caused by legally imposed segregation." The goal of
reparations is equality. In seeking a remedy for the injuries of segre-
gation, Professor Bittker turns to the legal system which once sup-
ported the wrong. He finds adequate precedent for damage actions
founded on official misconduct which violates constitutional rights.7
Professor Bittker never satisfactorily explores the possible structure
of a comprehensive reparations program, but he seems to believe that
ultimately legislation would be required.8
t J.D. 1959, New York University; Professor and Chairman, Afro-American Studies
Department, Harvard University.
1. B. BrrXER, THE CASE FOR BLCK REPARATIONS 159 (1973) [hereinafter cited to page
number only]. Forman's "Manifesto" was adopted by the National Black Economic De-
velopment Conference in Detroit, Michigan, April 26, 1969.
2. The book's genesis is outlined at pp. 3-7.
3. P. 68.
4. The problems are summarized at p. 136; the judgment that Profmsor Bittker has
described them as insurmountable is the reviewer's.
5. P. 137.
6. P. 19.
7. His precedent is twofold. First, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. 403 U.S. 38S
(1971), established the principle that the federal government may be liable in money
damages for violations of constitutional rights. See District of Columbia v. Carter. 409
U.S. 418, 432-33 (1973). Second, anyone acting "under color or' state law might be liable
for violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
8. P. 21.
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The book's argument is founded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. Section 1983, he reasons, presently provides reme-
dies analogous to reparations; thus the demand for full reparations
is compatible with legal analysis. 9 But Professor Bittker discovers in
the difficulties of § 1983 analogues to the problems of potential repa-
rations programs.
For instance, Professor Bittker notes, a system of reparations
based on individual lawsuits of the sort authorized by § 1983 might
be "ungainly to administer" and could lead to "haphazard results."
The recipients themselves could feel the system "invidious."' 10 These
ills might be mitigated by developing a doctrine of "unitary state lia-
bility,"" but Professor Bittker seems to concede-as one might have
foreseen-that federal funds would be needed to insure adequate re-
muneration.12
In analogizing § 1983 to the reparations claim, the author is drawn
rather too deeply into the complexities of the case law. He investigates
the problems of municipal liability, 3 good faith defense,' 4 and sov-
ereign immunity.' 5 The discussion is neither complete nor necessary
since he claims he is not primarily concerned with the technical pos-
sibility of using § 1983 to generate reparations suits.' The analogy
to § 1983 serves most of all to reveal reparations claims as legitimate.
The nonlawyer should not lose track of this as Professor Bittker ex-
poses the various implications of his analogy. Nor should the lawyer
be frustrated by the incompleteness of the § 1983 discussion; this essay
is not a litigation guide for reparations suits.
The book's real value-and indeed its self-confessed purpose"-is
to rationalize the reparations issue and to initiate a national debate
on the subject. Professor Bittker only hints at solutions to the prob-
lems he investigates. Nonetheless, he may be the first white lawyer
to address the subject since Lincoln spoke of "the bondsman's two
hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil."18




12. P. 16. Federal funding is also appropriate in view of federal complicity in main-
taining a segregated society. Id.
13. Pp. 49-58.
14. Pp. 40-48.
15. P. 149 n.63.
16. P. 59.
17. P. 7.
18. Second Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln, March 4, 1865, in ADRAIAr LIN.
COLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGs 792-93 (R. Basler ed. 1946).
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was quoting from black clergyman Henry Highland Garnet's 1843
call for slave rebellions. 10 Earlier still, in 1829, David Walker had pas-
sionately protested the lack of compensation for the labor of slaves
in his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World.20 After the Civil
War Bishop Henry McNeal Turner called for reparations on nu-
merous occasions.2 1
Calls for compensation have increased in frequency and amplitude
since the Second World War. This reviewer suggested massive federal
expenditures in 1950.22 In 1963 Whitney Young supported a "domes-
tic Marshall Plan" to ameliorate the oppressed condition of blacks.2 3
Martin Luther King proposed a "Bill of Rights for the Disadvan-
taged," arguing that the "moral justification for special measures for
Negroes is rooted in the robberies inherent in the institution of
slavery."2 4
Money has not always been sought.2 Just as § 1983 protects property
rights as well as personal rights,20 so have reparations demands some-
times been based on claims to property: In 1967 the Newark Black
Power Conference passed a resolution to "initiate a national dialogue
on the desirability of partitioning the United States into two separate
and independent nations, one to be a homeland for white and the
other a homeland for black Americans."2 7
James Forman's interruption of the Riverside Church service was
thus a dramatic presentation to whites of demands long voiced by
blacks. And, as Professor Bittker notes, white reaction to a century
of black demands for reparations was "consistent with a New York
Times editorial observation [with respect to Forman's speech], that
'there is neither wealth nor wisdom enough in the world to compen-
sate in money for all the wrongs in history.' "28 Professor Bittker, to
19. Address by Henry Highland Garnet, Buffalo, N.Y., 1843, in S. SrttiKEv, THE IDE-
OLOGICAL ORIGINs OF BLACK NAIoNALssf 169 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SmucKE'].
20. Walker, Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, in SmcCEV 87.88.
21. See, e.g., Speech by Henry McNeal Turner, in Georgia Legislature, September 3.
1868, in THE VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA 364 (P. Foner ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as TuE
VoiCE OF BLACK AmEr.CA].
22. Guinier, The Negro Depression: A Warning for All America, National Guardian,
June 14, 1950, at 4, col. 1. I suggested a $50 billion, five-year federal works program.
23. Address by Whitney M. Young, Jr., at the National Conference of the Urban
League, New York, 1963, in THE Voice OF BLACK A.iEas. 967.
24. Pp. 8-9 (footnote omitted).
25. Nor does Professor Bittker believe that compensation need be only monetary. P. 84.
26. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
the jurisdictional counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), makes no distinction between
personal liberties and property rights).
27. R. BROWNE & R. VERNON, SHOULD THE U.S. BE PARTrrtONED? 4 (1968).
28. P. 5. Professor Bittker recognizes black iteration of reparations demands. P. 6.
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his credit, was not satisfied with white society's despairing approach
to black reparations.
Professor Bittker seems to accept the idea that in the process of
development American society created the problems to which the
claim for reparations is addressed. He appears not to favor compen-
sation for the years of slavery, but believes that reparations should
be founded on the injuries incurred by a century of post-emancipation
institutionalized segregation.29 To redress past inequity and to assure
future equal status in society some form of compensation must be paid
to the injured parties.
Professor Bittker, however, foresees a dilemma in the administra-
tion of reparations. Individual reparations, according to Professor
Bittker, might require racial classifications akin to Hitler's labelling
of Jews3" or South Africa's registration of Europeans, Bantus, and
Coloureds.31 Furthermore, Professor Bittker argues, reparations to in-
dividuals may not be equally justified. Black professors and black wel-
fare mothers are both descendants of slaves and products of a segre-
gated society, but Professor Bittker suggests they can hardly make the
same claim to a share of the national budget.32 Group reparations,
on the other hand, he says, would require the government to select
among different interests claiming to represent a race,33 would place
black organizations in the role of mendicants at the federal fisc,34 and
would not guarantee adequate distribution to individuals.35
The dilemma, it seems to me, is more apparent than real. Broad
legislation to achieve reparations can transcend the difficulties of ad-
ministration. An administrative agency given adequate staff and prop-
er statutory guidance could produce equity for individuals. The clas-
sification problems in this context should be no more insoluble than
those faced in other affirmative action programs. 36 Moreover, resort
to racial classifications for remedial purposes has received the impri-
matur of the Supreme Court:
29. P. 28. The past century, of course, has been influenced by tile period of slavery
preceding it.
30. See generally p. 179 for a discussion of the subject of reparations to Nazi victhns.




35. The Indian Claims Commission hears claims presented "on behalf of any Indian
tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians," p. 73, but Professor Bittker*
rejects this as "at best a weak analogy [to proper treatment of blacks] and at worst a
misleading one." P. 75.
36. Professor Bittker discusses remedial racial classifications in the context of public
employment, housing, municipal services, and union membership. Pp. 120.21.
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Just as the race of students must be considered in determining
whether a violation has occurred, so also must race be considered
in formulating a remedy.37
Even if these administrative difficulties should prove insurmount-
able, the answer to the classification problem would not lie in aban-
doning reparations. Rather the answer is to expand the solution. As
Al Smith said, the cure for democracy is more democracy; the cure
for difficulties in correcting institutionally-imposed inequity is more
correcting of inequity. In short, legislation for reparations could
be generalized to erase societal disadvantages suffered by whites as well
as blacks.38
Our national social policies have clearly failed to solve the prob-
lems of poor Americans-both black and white. Black reformers, in-
deed, have previously noted that their aim was to better the condition
of whites as well as blacks.39 In May 1969, Charles Evers, black mayor
of Fayette, Mississippi, told a New York audience, "[W]e . . . are
going to make it better for blacks and whites . . . . There are thirty-
nine million poor folks in this country, and we blacks are only twenty-
two million."' 40 Furthermore, the aggressive efforts of black individ-
uals and associations have served to galvanize other disadvantaged
groups and to initiate a broad movement aimed at achieving social
justice for all poor people.
Recognition of a minority's demands may depend on the continued
reiteration of those demands, and Professor Bittker's book is important
in this continuum. He clothes the reparations demand in the raiment
of dispassionate academic analysis, and thus encourages prospects for
wide recognition and discussion of the issue. His discussion of the
practical difficulties of reparations also no doubt generates the im-
pression that the problems are very great, the solutions very tentative,
and the likelihood of success very small. This impression must be
resisted; the problems of reparations can be solved and must be solved.
National debate on the issue of reparations should be conducted with
reason but also motivated by necessity.
37. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971). See pp.
120-21.
38. As Professor Bittker notes, a reparations program which singled out blacks for
compensation might be subject to constitutional challenge. Pp. 105-27.
39. See, e.g., H. AIraK.R, AFRo-AMERI N HtsroRY 301. 307 (1971); W.E.B. DuBois
SPEAKS: SPEECHES AND ARTiCLE 1920-1963, at 202 (P. Foner ed. 1970).
40. Speech by Charles Evers, New York, May 1969, in TiHE VoICEz oF BLAC% .\AmxjcA
1168.
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Advances have been made in black education, for instance, but much
remains to be done. Blacks' preparation for college is still inadequate41
and assistance in the form of scholarship funds is desperately needed-
by whites as well as blacks.42 Job opportunities and income levels also
need substantial improvement.43 Twenty percent of blacks and eight
percent of whites have yearly incomes below $3,000. 44 Reparations in
the broadest sense are owed to these poor people because the social
structure has left them unable to earn a decent income. If no action
is taken reparations will be owed their children.
Reparations might be a means for equality; the term might also be
a metaphorical characterization for any program which achieves equali-
ty. In either case, there never has been equality in America, there is
no equality now, and there will never be equality without remedial
action. The problems of reparations outlined by Professor Bittker are,
of course, not to be ignored. But the black minority's unflagging de-
mand for reparations-and thus equality-cannot be left unrequited.
Political scandals and international concerns seem to dominate to.
day's political processes. Problems of the disadvantaged, on the other
hand, are neglected. This lack of action is not only unfortunate; it is,
as Professor Bittker has helped show, unjust. And injustice, in a coun-
try ruled by law, must be remedied; damages must be paid.
41. N.Y. Times, May 20, 1973, § 4, at 11, col. 2 (city ed.).
42. A panel of educators in May issued a call for annual grants of up to $2,000 each
to college students whose adjusted family income is below $9,622. Id.
43. All of these problems are, of course, interrelated. Even if industry makes job op.
portunities available, there may not be qualified blacks to fill them unless black cduca-
tional opportunities are substantially expanded. Thus, J. Stanford Smith, Senior Vice
President, General Electric Company, has said:
To put the challenge bluntly, unless we can start producing not 400, but 4,000 to
6,000 minority engineers a year within the decade, industry will not be able to
achieve its goals of equality, and the nation is going to face social problems of un-
manageable dimensions.
The only acceptable solution is to take bold, innovative, all-out action [to overcome
what the] Ford Foundation study by Fred Crossland describes [as] the barriers of
poor preparation; of poor motivations; of money and distance and prejudice on all
sides .... Some forms of government support will be necessary . . . . We are talking
about an undertaking of staggering proportions that requires revolutionary action.
CONTACT, Spring 1973, at 36 (emphasis in original).
44. A. BALLARD, THE EDUCATION OF BLACK FOLK 144 (1973).
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The Politics of a Guaranteed Income. By Daniel P. Moynihan. New
York: Random House, 1973. Pp. xiii, 579. 510.00.
Reviewed by Henry Aaront
The Politics of a Guaranteed Income is Daniel P. Moynihan's politi-
cal memoir of President Nixon's first effort to broaden and improve
income supplements for poor Americans. To a subject as depressing
and complex as the welfare system, Moynihan brings a sense of enthu-
siasm and involvement, wrapped in lively, if self-indulgent, prose.
The title is important. First, the book deals largely with politics,
not with economic or legal issues, not even with the welfare system
itself. Second, the book is limited to the Family Assistance Plan (FAP),
the President's 1969 welfare bill. Moynihan devotes only a two-page
afterword to H.R. 1, President Nixon's second attempt at welfare re-
form, which was introduced in January 1971 and defeated in the Sen-
ate Finance Committee in the summer of 1972.
The termination of the political narrative with the events of 1970
and the failure to explain the welfare system are the book's two greatest
deficiencies. A second complete cycle of political efforts occurred in
1971 and 1972. These events cast considerable doubt on Moynihan's
contention that the Administration wholeheartedly supported welfare
reform and that blame for congressional rejection must be placed at
other doorsteps. The sketchy description of the welfare sytem-the
web of income-tested programs providing benefits in-kind as well as
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)-leaves the reader
totally at sea at the dramatic crisis of Moynihan's narrative: After
lengthy study within the Administration and revision in the House,
the Family Assistance Plan was scuttled by Senator John J. Williams'
simple but unanticipated' questions about the interrelations between
FAP and other federally-supported benefit programs.
I
Moynihan describes the intellectual development and the political
history of the Family Assistance Plan in partisan terms. The idea of a
t Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; Department of Economics, University of
Maryland.
1. D. MOYNiHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GuARAaNEED INCOME 483 (1973) [hereinafter cited
to page number only].
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negative income tax was conceived by a conservative, 2 developed into a
legislative proposal under a Democratic administration, and finally
proposed by a Republican President. In the House, sixty-three percent
of the Democrats and fifty-nine percent of the Republicans supported
FAP. The introduction by a Republican President of a bill which
Moynihan regards as politically liberal but, at the same time, intellec-
tually conservative put many off balance and kept them there.3
Response to the proposal did not conform to predictable party lines.
Inside the Administration, Moynihan, Richard Nathan of the Bureau
of the Budget, HEW Secretary Robert Finch and Undersecretary John
Veneman favored the bill. Arthur Bums, then Counsellor to the
President, and Vice President Agnew opposed it. In the House, sup-
port came from centrist and liberal members of both parties. Opposi-
tion came from Southern and Northern conservatives who thought
FAP was too generous and would underwrite idleness and from lib-
erals who thought it too stingy and punitive in its work requirement.
The reaction of groups outside government was equally diverse.
Journalists of the left, center and moderate right announced support
ranging from cautious to enthusiastic, but sharp opposition developed
from the far right. Surveys indicated broad public support. Labor re-
action varied, but no union opposed FAP outright. Among business-
men, the Chamber of Commerce opposed FAP, while the Committee
for Economic Development supported it. Endorsements from organ-
ized religion ranged from warm to tepid. The social welfare profession
and the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), the only
organization speaking for AFDC recipients (primarily those in the
Northeast), opposed it with steadily rising passion.
FAP died in the Senate Finance Committee, Moynihan relates, partly
because that committee was markedly more conservative than the Sen-
ate as a whole 4 partly because liberals whose support the Administra-
tion expected were not very well informed about welfare matters' and
were influenced by the NWRO's persistent, violent opposition to the
proposal, and partly because Secretary Finch crumbled under Senator
2. Moynihan credits Milton Friedman with fathering the idea of a negative income
tax. While the paternity can be argued, the care and nurture provided by liberal aca-
demics changed the negative income tax from a literary speculation into a serious pro.
posal. See C. GREEN, NEGATIVE TAXES AND THE POVERTY PROBLEM (1967); Tobin, Pechman &
Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE L.J. 1 (1967). The effort to
bestow credit for discovery of an idea upon the political left or right may strike readers
as a jejune exercise, of course, but it is significant in the context of this book, since
Moynihan seems to regard the negative income tax as intellectually conservative, regard-
less of its level of support or implicit tax rate. See Part II infra.
3. P. 446.
4. P. 455.
5. Moynihan reserves his most caustic criticism for Senator Fred Harris. See p. 483.
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Williams' interrogation." A swirl of last-minute maneuvers to revive
the bill on the Senate floor failed despite the existence of a solid major-
ity in favor of FAP.7
The moral of the political story, according to Moynihan, is that
FAP had bad luck. If only the Finance Committee had been as work-
manlike as the Ways and Means Committee in the House, if only
Finch had been more capable or less worn-down when Williams ques-
tioned him, if only events had moved more swiftly, the Senate would
have passed the bill.
Moynihan argues that FAP was a milestone in social legislation that
deserved to become law. His argument rests on a pair of sharp distinc-
tions. The first concerns the difference between poverty (lack of
money) and dependency (the prolonged acceptance of support from
others). Moynihan argues that FAP, in contrast to previous welfare
programs, dealt innovatively with both. Second, Moynihan believes
that FAP was meritorious because it represented an "income" strategy,
which combats poverty through direct cash payments, rather than a
"eservices" strategy, which provides in-kind benefits such as medical
care, food, and education or training. Moynihan contends that the
services strategy has done little more than humiliate recipients; an
income strategy could at least sustain people in dignity, even if it did
not make them self-supporting.
Also underlying Moynihan's view of FAP is his interpretation of
why welfare roles grew rapidly in the late 1960's.8 He draws heavily
on his previously enunciated concern over the decline of the family
in general, and the nonwhite family in particular.0 Although job pros-
pects improved during the 1960's, to be on the dole became acceptable.
The solution to the problems of the poor in the 1960's had been serv-
ices. This approach, Moynihan contends, largely failed to help the poor,
though it aided members of the middle and upper class who dispensed




8. Pp. 82 passim.
9. US. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, THE NEGP.O FAMILY:
THE CASE FOR NAmONAL AcrION (1965), popularly known as the moynihan Report.
10. This plausible but illogical argument implies that when the government bu)s
medical care and gives it free of charge to the poor, it is really helping dcctors, but When
the government gives the poor cash which they spend on medical care, it is helping the
poor. The argument contains a kernel of truth: When the government sharpl) increases
the demand for a service, such as medical care, the supply of which cannot be promptly
expanded, the price of that service may rise. But Moynihan masks this poit behind
scornful criticism for the professionals who, like Tom Lehrer's old dope pdler do well
by doing good.
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The most promising alternative to the services mess was an income
strategy, exemplified by FAP. FAP proposed an income floor of $1,600
(plus food stamps worth over $800 per year) for a family of four. In
the North most benefits would accrue to families headed by an unem-
ployed male, then largely excluded from AFDC. In the South FAP
would raise benefits for female-headed families served poorly, if at all,
by stingy state welfare agencies. No family would have suffered by the
enactment of FAP, Moynihan argues and the President stated in pub-
lic," and the most egregiously inadequate benefits would be raised.
The political acceptability and actual operation of FAP depended
upon the structure of the work requirement: which recipients would
have to work at what kinds of jobs, encouraged by what sanctions for
refusal. The Administration's proposal required unemployed FAP ap-
plicants to register with an employment service and to accept suitable
work or training. Mothers of preschool children and spouses of em-
ployed or registered mothers were exempt. The penalty for refusal was
denial of a portion of benefits. 12
II
Nearly every segment of Moynihan's argument is called in question
by other participants in the struggle over FAP, by facts, by logic, or by
Moynihan himself. To take the last point first, The Politics of a Guar-
anteed Income is laced with inconsistencies. For example, was the
Family Assistance Plan a negative income tax, a guaranteed income,
both, or neither? Moynihan approvingly quotes various Administra-
tion spokesmen who refer to FAP under varying labels.'8 Although
these semantic acrobatics may have been motivated by concern over
the political impact of the various labels-the President was anxious
to avoid the "free ride" connotations of "guaranteed income"' 4-Moy
11. P. 223.
12. Under the Administration's proposal the penalty was $300 per year. The House
increased the penalty to $500.
13. From the title of the book one gathers that Moynihan considers FAP a guaranteed
income plan. See p. 3. Schultz, on the other hand, told the Senate Finance Committee,
"This [FAP] is not a proposal for a guaranteed income. Work is a major feature of this
program." P. 404. Moynihan himself, in explaining why FAP experienced so much diffi-
culty in Congress, writes, "The negative income tax was only dimly understood." 1'. 434.
14. The President in announcing FAP contrasted it with a guaranteed income:
A guaranteed income establishes a right without any responsibilities, family assist-
ance recognizes a need and establishes a responsibility. It provides help to those In
need and, in turn, requires that those who receive help work to the extent of their
capabilities. There is no reason why one person should be taxed so that another can
choose to live idly.
P. 224.
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nihan himself seems confused about what FAP actually would have
accomplished.
Whatever the label, all systems of cash assistance are defined by five
characteristics: (1) The amount paid to families of various sizes with no
income. (2) The extent to which benefits are reduced if family income
increases, i.e., the "implicit tax rate" which determines the net value
of any increased earnings. (3) The voluntary actions (such as seeking
or accepting jobs) which potential recipients must undertake to be-
come eligible for benefits. (4) The population groups the program
covered. (5) Other family characteristics, e.g., excessive assets or brief
residency, which lead to disqualification.
FAP would have created a uniform national minimum-benefit level
higher than existing benefits in eight states, but below those of the
other forty-two. It also would have increased sharply the "implicit tax
rate" (although contrary claims were made), instituted a limited work
requirement for eligibility, and, most importantly, included in its cov-
erage intact families, few of whom were aided by AFDC. The real
debate over FAP did not concern its name but, appropriately, these
characteristics. While labels are politically significant, Moynihan's vary-
ing designations do not help describe the vital aspects of FAP.
According to Moynihan AFDC actually increased dependency, and
a new program was needed to sever the link between welfare and ris-
ing dependency. Vital to the proof of this assertion is Moynihan's
observation that the historically close correlation betveen the non-
white male unemployment rate and the number of new AFDC cases
disappeared in the 1960's. 15 Why, Moynihan asks, did this well-estab-
lished relationship break down? The appropriate question is why lie
thought one ever existed.i 6 Nonwhites, slightly under half of AFDC
recipients today, were but a small fraction in 1960. More important,
AFDC is paid largely to female-headed families; neither the total nor
the rate of nonwhite male unemployment is correlated convincingly
in any simple way with the growth of female-headed families.17 The
rise in the AFDG caseload cannot even be correlated with growth in
the number of female-headed families. In short, the correlation on
15. P. 83.
16. Moynihan's approach to these statistics is reminiscent of the hypothesis of the
otherwise quite sensible nineteenth century British economist, Jevons, that because sun-
spots and business cycles were correlated the former caused the latter. The relationship
eventually broke down. See J. KEYNES, Essxys I N BiOGRAPv 255-109 (1951).
17. The number of AFDC recipients rose from 2.9 million in December 1959 to 7.3
million in December 1969, reaching 11 million in August 1972. From 1959, the number of
female-headed families in poverty first fell from just over to just under 7 million, and
then rose to 7.8 million in 1971.
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which Moynihan builds his discussion of dependence was purely a
coincidence. More probable explanations for the growing caseload,
largely disregarded by Moynihan, are increasing welfare militancy,
encouraged by NWRO and other groups, growing sympathy of welfare
agencies for the poor, and court decisions narrowing the bases on
which applicants for AFDC legitimately could be declared ineligible.
Moynihan's emphasis on dependency is even more puzzling because,
as he reveals, the Administration did not believe that FAP could solve
the dependency problem:
[W]ithin the White House it was judged that whatever was
"wrong" with "welfare," a system of income conditioned on de-
pendency, would stay wrong for a long while; that the situation
would probably grow worse before it grew better; and that when
it commenced to improve this would be the result of a concatena-
tion of forces no analysts could prescribe, and certainly no govern-
ment could contrive. As a consequence of this belief, the thrust
of the President's proposal was much more directed to the problem
of poverty than to that of dependency.18
Moynihan also confuses his analysis by muddying distinctions be-
tween various strategies for dealing with poverty. In general, the gov-
ernment may transfer income to people (an "income strategy") or to
lower governmental units (a "revenue sharing strategy"), it may pro-
vide services to people directly or through other levels of government
(the "services strategy"), or it may try to change economic or legal insti-
tutions (the "institution-changing strategy").
Moynihan begins well. After alluding to the disappointment he and
others felt with many parts of the poverty program, he writes:
Legal strategies had uses: obtaining rights in being. Services, simi-
larly, could be of value up to a point. But for most persons living
in poverty it appeared that a direct income strategy would show
the largest return. It would in any event show some return, and an
immediate one. This was an outcome government might desire
on many grounds. 19
The Nixon Administration pursued the income strategy, Moynihan
argues, and FAP was the principal element. Moynihan, however, does
not consider AFDG part of the income strategy, although overburdened
case workers do little else than approve checks. Other programs, such
18. P. 954 (emphasis in original).
19. P. 55.
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as food stamps20 and housing programs, are inconsistently characterized
as "services" or "income" depending on whether or not they meet
with his approval. In his effort to place the honorific label "income
strategy" on all good programs, he extends the term so broadly that
it loses all analytical value.21
The Family Assistance Plan could solve both poverty and depend-
ency if its participants were encouraged to work. To this end the Ad-
ministration proposed to eliminate benefits for persons who refused
work, but allowed recipients to keep more of each additional earned
dollar than they could under AFDC. The effect of FAP as a work in-
centive measure was uncertain. Moynihan quotes with approval sources
reaching seemingly inconsistent conclusions on this question.2 2 An
20. The following comments on food stamps and commodity distribution leave one
nonplussed:
The food programs [food stamps and commodity distribution] pursued an income
strategy through a service technique and combined the disadvantages of both.
P. 117.
The food stamp program was, in essence, a universal s)stem of income support for
the working poor.
P. 175.
In a conversation with his secretary of agriculture on a major proposed expansion of
food stamps, President Nixon stated:
You can say . . . that this Administration will have the first comprehensive, far.
reaching attack on the problem of hunger in history.
P. 121. But. later Moynihan writes:
Richard Nixon, who was not the least disposed to utopianism, proposed a guaranteed
income because he thought it must be dreadful to send one's daughter to the store
with food stamps.
P. 304.
21. Moynihan argues that legislation proposed by the Administration would have
converted federal housing programs to the "income strategy" merely by altering the rent
computation formulas, p. 494; that Medicaid which provided free health care to AFDC
recipients and to the medically-indigent promoted dependency, p. 492, while the Ad-
ministration's Family Health Insurance Program (FHIP). which offered health insurance
free to the very poor, with an income-tested premium for those with more income, uas
part of the income strategy and did not promote dependency; and that the various train-
ing programs of the 1960's were a part of the services strategy, while the training to be
offered in conjunction with FAP advanced the income strategy.
The reductio ad absurdum of the "income strategy" comes on p. 212:
On July 18 [President Nixon] sent to Congress the first presidential message on
population, in which pari passu, he asserted, "It is clear that the domestic family.
planning services supported by the Federal government should be expanded and
integrated:" . . . Large families being a fundamental source of poverty among the
population "at risk," this proposal, soon to be endorsed by the Congress, should be
seen as an integral element of the income strategy the Administration had adopted
and was now seeking to implement.
P. 212 (emphasis in original).
22. Moynihan quotes OEO Assistant Director John 0. Wilson's report that a New
Jersey negative income tax experiment showed that "(there is no evidence that work
effort declined among those receiving income support payments." P. 192. Later he quotes
Hyman Minsky's statement that "a sizable negative tax would lead to withdrawal of
labor from the market and increased consumption by those not directly beneficiaries."
P. 249. This makes the work incentive question sound settled-both wa)s at once-but it is
in fact open. While Moynihan properly notes that the New Jersey findings were "pre-
liminary," he fails to mention that the study was limited to male-headed families and
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understanding of the possibly complex effect of FAP on the work
effort of different families is central to an assessment of FAP's social
impact and political feasibility. The reader of The Politics of a Guar-
anteed Income is spared discussion of this vital point.
Probably no one in the Administration and very few outside it fully
understood the marginal tax rate problem when FAP was proposed.
The Politics of a Guaranteed Income makes one wonder whether Moy-
nihan understands it even now. He demonstrates that FAP would have
reduced the payoff from work for virtually all recipients. Yet he per-
sists in regarding FAP as a lost chance to reverse the tide of increasing
dependency sweeping over America.
Under AFDC regulations, benefits are reduced by two-thirds of earn-
ings over $360 per year. Under FAP, benefits would have been reduced
by one-half of any earnings over $720 per year. The effective tax rates
under FAP would have varied considerably from state to state but
would have been higher in nearly all cases than under AFDC. All but
eight states would have supplemented the basic $1600 grant for a fam-
ily of four; reduction of these state benefits, as personal income rose,
would mean an increase in the effective tax rate from 50 percent to
about 66 2/3 percent. Furthermore, under FAP, intact low-income fam-
ilies, who were ineligible for AFDC, but paid no federal income taxes,
would have become subject to a "tax" on their FAP benefits of at least
50 percent.
The interaction of any form of cash assistance, AFDC or FAP, with
the welter of extant in-kind benefits further raises effective tax rates..2 3
Each of these "service" programs charges an implicit tax by reducing
service benefits as income rises. Furthermore, under FAP, state welfare
agencies would no longer have paid the state and federal taxes, payroll
taxes, and certain work-related expenses of AFDC recipients. In some
cases cumulative tax rates would have exceeded 100 percent. A family
might receive less money by increasing its income.2 4
that research has suggested that different kinds of families respond differently to the
negative income tax: The work effort of female-headed families is likely to respond more
than that of male-headed families, that of older workers more than that of prime-age
workers, and that of childless workers more than that of parents.
23. In a recent study for the Joint Economic Committee of the Incidence of benefits
for low-income families, the General Accounting Office discovered that among randomly
selected families in six low-income communities, sixty percent of all households were
receiving at least one kind of public welfare benefit. Of those receiving at least one
benefit, sixty-six percent received at least two, forty-three percent received at least three,
and nineteen percent received at least five. See Storey, Townsend & Cox, How Welfare
Benefits are Distributed in Low Income Areas, in STuDIEs IN PUBLIC WELFARE, SUBCOMM.
ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93d CONG., 1St SEss. passim (Paper No. 6,
1973).
24. Pp. 475-79. Under FAP, rates over 100 percent occurred principally at "notches"-
the complete cessation of benefits under one or more programs when income rises a small
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The full impact of reimbursement for work related expenses under
AFDC has recently been shown in computations of effective tax rates.
Persons who receive only AFDC face effective tax rates much below
66 2/3 percent; even families which receive a full range of benefits
retain some portion of additional earned income.- Thus, the AFDC
system, for all its faults, may discourage work less than does FAP.
Finally, Moynihan omits altogether any discussion of FAP's admin-
istrative features. One of FAP's most radical aspects was its promise of
uniform federal administration. The federal government was to ad-
minister FAP and to assume administrative costs for both FAP and
supplemental benefits if states surrendered administrative responsibil-
ity for state supplemental benefits. This step would have not only re-
duced the administrative inequities rampant in the current system,
but also shifted power on the peculiarly sensitive question of public
aid to the poor from states and localities to the national level. Inatten-
tion to this question in a book on politics is odd and regrettable.
III
Moynihan shows that a peculiar confluence of political needs and
objective problems made possible in 1969 that most rare of legislative
events, a sharp break with past practices. This break, however, did not
occur.
Moynihan places part of the blame on the social work profession and
NWRO. Confronted with a proposal which injured their constituents,
even if it helped others among the poor, they did not try to improve
the legislation but simply opposed it. In light of the fate of FAP, a
$4 billion program, NWRO's proposed floor of $5,500 (later $6,500),
with an annual cost of $60-$100 billion, can only be regarded as
fanciful."
Moynihan takes great pains to show that the President really cared
about welfare reform. But he acknowledges that conservatives in the
White House tried to convince senators "that the President's support
for the legislation was waning, or even that he had never really sup-
amount. For example, medicaid benefits, sometimes worth more than $1,000 on the
average, are available in some states as long as the patient is receiving even $1 in public
assistance, but cease abruptly when eligibility for public assistance is lost.
H.R. 1, welfare reform's second incarnation, was even worse, in part because the int-
plicit tax rate on benefits was raised from 50 to 66 2/3 percent and in part because of
changes in the Medicaid program. See Aaron, Why is Welfare So Hard to Reform? 39
(The Brookings Institution, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Aaron].
25. Hausman, Cumulative Tax Rates in Alternative Income Maintenance Systems, in
STUDIES IN PUBLIC W LFARE, SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMsIC CO?,M., 92d
CONG., 2d SEss. 92-138 (Paper No. 4, 1972); Lurie, Estimates of Tax Rates in AFDC
(University of Wisconsin mimeograph, 1973).
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ported it to begin with" and that while these statements "released
many conservative Republicans from obligations of loyalty . . . their
influence was most notable among liberals of both parties. ' 20 Moynihan
never explains why the President failed to stop these underlings from
misrepresenting him. Senator Ribicoff, on the other hand, blames
President Nixon for killing FAP with inattention after Moynihan and
other supporters of FAP left the Administration and for assuming a
rigid "take FAP or nothing" attitude when the Senate Finance Com-
mittee was trying to find a compromise.2 7 Richard Nathan's defense
of the President in this regard merely reinforces the judgment that the
President was unwilling to compromise, a peculiar stance on the part
of a political leader committed to reform.28
FAP's rise and fall marked the end of an era in antipoverty legisla-
tion. For four decades, presidents have proposed and Congress has en-
acted programs to give money and services to the needy: cash grants,
below-cost housing, free or below-cost medical care, free lunches and
day care, subsidized or free food, college scholarships and loans, and a
long list of other free, subsidized, or income-conditioned benefits. With
few exceptions Congress has defined eligibility so broadly and set ap-
propriations so low that not all eligibles could be served. To scale
benefits to funding, agencies have narrowed eligibility by administra-
tive devices not related to the purposes of the programs or they have
let queues ration available benefits. Under many programs Congress
has left considerable discretion in the hands of local government.
The political landscape is now littered with poverty programs which
are impressively broad and expensive29 but striking in the gross varia-
tion of services provided and the implicit tax rates generated.3 0 As a
result, families with similar earnings receive highly variable benefits
and face widely divergent tax rates.
FAP ran smack into this system: By failing to integrate FAP with
26. P. 373.
27. Ribicoff, He Left at Half-Time, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1973, at 22.
28. Nathan attributes weakness in the White House "not to the President's changing
his mind, as Senator Ribicoff and others argue, but to the departure of FAP . . . from
the President's original design." Nathan, Family Assistance Plan: Work/Welfare, NEw
REPUBLIC, January 24, 1973, at 19.
29. Of households that receive some assistance, nineteen percent receive benefits under
at least five programs. Families living in generous states may receive as much as $6,000
to $7,000 in benefits per year, roughly fifty percent above the official poverty threshold.
Cf. Storey, Townsend & Cox, supra note 23. On the other hand, many households qualify,
or have the knowledge to apply, for few if any benefits.
30. In 1971 the average tax rates for a four-person family under AFDC in Chicago
were 83 percent on the first $8,698 in earnings (72 percent on the first $10,724 under the
unemployed father segment of the AFDC program), 61 percent on the first $10,311 of
earnings in St. Louis, 71 percent on the first $6,850 in Wilmington, Delaware, and 91
percent on the first $7,100 in Detroit, Michigan. See Hausman, supra note 25.
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other programs and by failing to deal convincingly with the problem
of work incentives, the Administration enabled senators who were per-
haps unsympathetic to FAP's basic purposes to demonstrate that there
could be no basic reform in AFDG without attention to numerous
other in-kind programs. 31
The next proposal to assist the poor must coordinate major existing
programs. The age of myopic legislation is past. Legislators and social
reformers can no longer ignore the fact that each program serves many
who benefit from other programs, that coverage is spotty and highly
uneven, and that each implicit tax rate interacts with others and may
discourage additional earnings.
This lesson is sobering. The technical and political problems en-
countered by FAP and H.R. 1, bills that dealt principally with cash
assistance for the poor, were difficult enough. Complete reform must
alter several existing programs that pass through separate congressional
committees, that are administered by separate bureaucracies, that meet
distinct needs, and that are defended by independent lobbies and
interest groups. The lesson is not that welfare reform must await a
single millennial revision of all social legislation. Rather, the task is to
design fair programs that mesh with one another, do not require
utopian expenditures, and do not discourage work.32 The strength of
Moynihan's book is that he graphically lays the last failure before us;
the weakness is that he gives us no insight about how to do better
next time.
31. H.R. 1, FAPs successor, did contain an income-related deduction for Medicaid
recipients. And Senator Long did propose to convert Medicaid into a s)stcm of health
insurance with premiums based on income. See generaly Aaron, supra note 24. Both
proposals only increased work disincentives. See Allen, A Funny Thing Happened on
the Way to Welfare Reform (Urban Institute, 1972).
52. For an attempt to design a system of income maintenance, medical insurance, and
housing allowances that meets this test, see Aaron 47-69. The system of cash assistance
proposed there is predicated on the political presumption that elected officials arc con-
cerned more that recipients will curtail the number of hours worked than that they will
take jobs at reduced hourly wages. Accordingly, the formula imposes a low tax on in-
creases in earnings from longer hours worked but a high tax on increases in hourly
earnings. This plan is integrated with a system of national health insurance, se Feld-
stein, Friedman & Luft, Distributional Health Insurance Benefits and Finance, 25 NA-
TIONAL TAX J. 497 (1972), and with a small system of housing allowanccs based both on
family income and housing expenditures.
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Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding. By National Commission
on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1972. Pp. x, 184. $1.00 (paperback); 2 vol. app., pp. xi,
1252. $10.75 (paperback).
Cannabis. By Commission of Inquiry Into the Non-Medical Use of
Drugs. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972. Pp. xiii, 426. $3.00 (paper-
back).
Reviewed by Michael H. Tonryt
Widespread use of cannabis' in the United States, most commenta-
tors agree, was initiated by Mexican laborers early in the twentieth
century.2 By the early 1960's cannabis had become a major recrea-
tional drug in North America. Its use increased exponentially,8 and
by 1971 24 million Americans 4 and 1.5 million Canadiansr had used
the drug.
Cannabis possession and transfer was legal in every American state
until 1915, when Utah enacted the first state prohibition statute. By
1937 all forty-eight states had adopted laws relating to cannabis.0 As
t Lecturer in Law, University of Birmingham, England.
1. Marihuana and hashish are derivatives of the Indian Hemp plant, cannabis Saliva
L. Marihuana is a combination of leaves, twigs, flowers and resin of cannabis saliva L.
and is the prevalent derivative in use in the United States. See NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA-A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 50 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as SHAFER REPORT]. Hashish, which has a higher proportion of resin
and is more potent than marihuana, is the more common in Canada, COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY INTO THE NON-MEDICAL USE or DRUGS, CANNABIS 188 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
LEDAIN REPORT), and in England, BRITISH ADVISORY COMMtrrEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE,
CANNABIS 9 (1968) [hereinafter cited as WoOTTON REPORT].
2. For a brief historical survey of American cannabis use, see LiciT & ILLICIT DRUGS
(E. Brecher, et al. eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMERS UNION REIORT]. For evidence
of early use by Americans see, e.g., F. LUDLOW, THE HASHEESII EATER: BEING PASSAGES
FROm THE LIFE OF A PYTHAGOREAN (1857); B. TAYLOR, THE LAND OF THE SARAMENS: OR
PICTURES OF PALESTINE, ASIA MINOR, SICILY AND SPAIN (1855).
3. Citing Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics, the Shafer Report noted a tenfold
increase in state cannabis arrests in five years, from 18,815 in 1965 to 188,682 in 1970,
an eighty percent increase in cannabis arrests by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs between 1965 and 1968, and a 362 percent increase in cannabis arrests by tie
United States Bureau of Customs between 1965 and 1970. SHAFER REPORT 106.
4. SHAFER REPORT 32-33.
5. Canada's drug problem appears to be mostly a cannabis problem. In 1970, twenty.
six of twenty-eight convictions for illegal import or export of drugs involved cannabis.
Cannabis offenses constituted twenty-two of twenty-six import-export convictions in 1971.
In 1970 convictions for trafficking or possession for the purpose of trafficking numbered
1005, of which 802 involved cannabis. LEDAIN REI'ORT 232-37.
6. Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An
Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marihuana Prohibition, 56 U. VA. L. REv.
971, 1034 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Forbidden Fruit]. Bonnie and Whitebread reviewed
legislative histories, contemporary newspaper accounts, and other sources to discover that
enactment of the early state cannabis laws was relatively invisible, unheeded by the news-
papers or the general public, and uninformed by scientific evidence. Id. at 1026. See also
MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE 210-29 (1973).
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cannabis consumption and controversy increased during the sixties,
state legislatures reduced statutory penalties. At the writing of the
report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse
[Shafer Report], forty-two states and the District of Columbia classi-
fied marihuana possession as a misdemeanor and four labelled it a
felony. In eleven jurisdictions casual transfers were treated as posses-
sion; in twenty-seven, conditional discharge was available for some
classes of defendants.7
In 1937 Congress entered the field of cannabis proscription with
the Marihuana Tax Act 8 which required persons to expose themselves
to state prosecution in order to comply with federal tax law.0 This
self-incriminatory aspect of the statute resulted in its being declared
unconstitutional in 1968.10 Two years later Congress reentered the
cannabis controversy with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970.11 The first national Canadian anti-cannabis
law was passed in 1923. The current legislation, the Narcotic Control
Act,12 provides penalties ranging from a seven-year minimum sentence
7. SHAFER REPORT 108.
8. Act of August 2, 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551-56 (repealed October 17, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, § 1l01(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292).
9. Transfers of cannabis under the 1937 Act were subject to a $1 per ounce tax if
made to a qualified transferee duly registered with the Internal Revenue Serice. Act
of August 2, 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551-56 (repealed October 27. 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-
513, § ll01(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292 [codified at 21 U.S.C..§§ 801-966]). The tax was $100
per ounce if the transferee were not suitably registered'and qualified. The dismal al-
ternatives facing cannabis users and traffickers were to use the approved order form
and pay the prohibitive $100 per ounce tax; use the order form. register as a trafficker
and pay the $1 per ounce tax; or sell and possess cannabis illegally. The alternatihes
exposed the individual to state criminal prosecution.
10. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1968).
11. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970). The 1970 Act is notable mostly because it reduced
penalties for federal drug offenses and eliminated mandatory minimum sentences. The
Act lists three types of controlled substances-marihuana, narcotic drugs, and depressants
and stimulants-on five schedules on the basis of a specific substance's potential for
abuse, the presence, absence, or extent of recognized medical uses, and the risk that it
will cause physical or psychological dependence. Schedule I drugs have no currently-
accepted medical use and may engender psychological or phjsical dependence. The Act
implicitly endorses belief in most of cannabis' alleged ill effects; both cannabis and
tetrahydrocannabinol, the principal psychoactive element of cannabis, are included in
Schedule I with heroin, various natural and synthetic opiates, natural hallucinogens such
as mescaline and peyote, and synthetic hallucinogens such as LSD and DMT. Cocaine,
by contrast, is a Schedule II controlled substance.
12. CAN. REV. STAT. C. 35, § 12 (1960-61); CAN. REv. STAT. c. N-I (1970).
The original Canadian cannabis legislation was the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act.
CAN. Rav. STAT. c. 22 (1923). Its origins are as clouded and ambiguous as those of the
American statutes. The LeDain Report attributes passage to sensational magazine ar-
ticles and a book which credited cannabis with capacity to immunize users to pain, void
moral responsibility, and induce homicidal or sadistic behavior. LEDAIN REPORT 230.
The LeDain Report also partially attributes the early cannabis laws to anti-asiatic feel-
ings. Id. The LeDain Commission reviewed the proceedings of the debates occasioned by
consideration and passage of the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act and located only in-
cidental references to cannabis and no discussion of the reasons for its inclusion in the
legislation as a dangerous drug. Id. The equivalent treatment of cannabis and heroin has
continued to the present.
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for importing or exporting to a six-month maximum for initial pos-
session convictions.' 3
Thousands of publications have discussed cannabis in the past 130
years. Most have been dubious scientific analyses of the drug and its
effects.' 4 Recent years have seen a proliferation of efforts at overall
assessments of the drug's role in society. These recent reports treat
the relationships of cannabis use to violence, sexuality, addiction,
opiate use, physical and mental injury, social maladjustment, and the
legal order.
The prototypical overall assessment was the Indian Hemp Drugs
Commission Report of 1894.'5 The Hemp Report,'0 commissioned
by the colonial government of India, rejected the traditional conten-
tions that cannabis is physically dangerous, criminogenic, or morally
debilitating, 17 and anticipated the claim of modern drug law reformers
that cannabis is a relatively safe intoxicant.' Fifty years later the
LaGuardia Report echoed the Hemp Report's general conclusions
about cannabis and additionally found no significant evidence that
cannabis use causes progression to the use of other drugs.', Beginning
in the late sixties, the trickle of overall assessments became a flood.20
13. The Act specifies five categories of offenses: importing or exporting, Unauthorized
cultivation of cannabis or opium poppies, trafficking, possession for the purpose of
trafficking, and simple possession. The law provides for maximum sentences of life in.
prisonment for trafficking and unauthorized importing or exporting convictions. Convic.
tion for unauthorized cultivation of cannabis exposes a defendant to a maximum seven-
year sentence. For simple possession offenses, the government may proceed by indictment
or summary conviction. Conviction by indictment may lead to a maximum seven-year
sentence while summary conviction subjects a defendant to a maximum six-month sen.
tence or a fine of $1,000 for a first offense with doubled maxima for a subsequent offense.
CAN. REV. STAT. ch. N-I, §§ 2, 3 (1970).
14. See CANADIAN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE NON-MEDICAL USE OF DRUGS, IN-
TERIM REPORT 73 (1970).
15. INDIAN HEMP DRUGS COMMISSION, MARIIHUANA (Jefferson Publishing Co. ed. 1969).
16. The Hemp Commission's inquiries into usage patterns, methods and extent of
cultivation, and consequences of cannabis use were comprehensive, although by modern
standards methodologically unsound. Hearings were conducted throughout British India.
Opinions were solicited from relevant officials and 1193 witnesses were heard. Id. at 180.
17. The Hemp Report suggested that although cannabis use can become habitual,
there are no injurious after-effects followin& cessation. It found that there was little
or no connection between the use of cannabis and crime, id. at 264, that the drug did
not have aphrodisiacal properties, id. at 198, and that it did not appear to cause insanity
in those who were not heavy users, id. at 264.
18. Id. at 223.
19. MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON MARIHUANA, THE MARIHUANA PROBLEM IN TIlE CITY OF
NEw YoRK (1944). In 1938 Mayor LaGuardia requested that the New York Academy of
Medicine inquire into the use of cannabis in New York City. The two-part study en-
ployed New York City plainclothes policemen to observe the social use of cannabis and
drew on results from medical experiments on seventy-seven volunteers, seventy.two of
them convicts.
20. See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND DRUG ABUSE (1971); E. BLOOM-
QUIST, MARIJUANA (1968); BOARD OF HEALTH COMMITrEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE AND DRUG
ABUSE IN NEW ZEALAND, FIRST REPORT (1970); L. GRINSPOON, MARIIIUANA RECONSIDERED
(1971); HEW, MARIHUANA AND HEALTH, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (1972); HEW,
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Most recently offered for public considerations are the Shafer Report
and the report by the Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical
Use of Drugs [LeDain Report]. 21
The two reports cover the same substantive ground, but the LeDain
Report is more comprehensive, detailed, and thoughtful. There is,
however, little basis on which to distinguish their substantive findings.
The Shafer Report observes that "no conclusive evidence exists of any
physical damage, disturbances of bodily processes or proven human
fatalities attributable solely to even very high doses of marihuana."' -"-
The LeDain Report asserts that the short-term physiological effects of
cannabis are insignificant and benign and notes that "'from the point
of view of lethal toxicity, cannabis must be considered one of the
safest drugs in either medical or non-medical use today."2 Both thus
affirm the eighty-year-old conclusions of the Hemp Report that mod-
erate cannabis use has no significant consequences for the user's phys-
ical well-being.
The reports note credible evidence that cannabis may cause tran-
sient impairment of short-term memory, occasional transient anxiety
in inexperienced users, and possible psychotic reactions in predisposed
persons.24 Consequently the reports call for more study of cannabis'
psychological effects.
They agree that cannabis causes no physical dependenceO- and that
psychological dependence, if any, occurs only among chronic, heavy
users,2 6 who are rare in the United States and Canada. The reports
find that there is a correlation between cannabis use and use of other
drugs, but they agree that no causal relationship has yet been shown.2 7
Nor, they agree, does cannabis use lead to the violation of laws other
than those proscribing cannabis.28
Some cannabis opponents charge that use causes loss of purpose,
sloth, and lethargy: in short, cannabis is a weed grown at Lethe's
wharf. The Shafer Report asserts that "chronic heavy use of marihuana
MARIHUANA AND HF iLr (1971); J. KAPLAN, 'MARIJUANA: THE NEW PRolnmo. (1970);
SWEDISH GOVERNMENT, THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM: PART II, COORDINATED MEASLRES (1959);
'WOOTrON REPORT, supra note 1.
21. The proper names are the Canadian Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical
Use of Drugs, called the LeDain Commission after its chairman, Dean Gerald LeDain
of Osgoode Hall Law School, and the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug
Abuse, called the Shafer Commission after its chairman, former Pennsyhania Govcrnor
Raymond Shafer.
22. SHAFER REPORT 56-57.
23. L DAIN REPORT 114.
24. LEDAIN REPORT 79-80; SHA.FER REPORT 57-59.
25. LEDAIN REPORT 123; SHAFER RFPORT 62.
26. LEDAIN REPORT 124; SH&FEm REPORT 62.
27. LEDAIN REPORT 130; SHAFER REPORT 88-89.
28. LEDAIN REPORT 110; SHAFER REPORT 76.
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may jeopardize social and economic adjustment of the adolescent."2 0
The Report fails, however, to clarify its logic. Adjustment may be
jeopardized because the drug causes torpor in its users. Or perhaps
society so stigmatizes cannabis either by general disapproval or crimi-
nal sanction that some users perceive no place for themselves in the
competitive system. Depending upon the choice of rationale, one
should blame the drug itself, society's attitude toward the drug, or
cannabis laws. The LeDain Report, in any event, asserts that cannabis
use alone does not cause youths to "drop out";30 it stresses the impos-
sibility of demonstrating that changes in aggressive and competitive
drives result from cannibis use rather than from changes in basic per-
sonal values.
Among the subjects discussed in the LeDain Report but omitted in
the Shafer Report are cannabis' chemical and pharmacological proper-
ties, methods of cultivation, means of distribution (both Canadian
and international), and the history of North American cannabis use.
Its conclusions are well documented; those of the Shafer Commission
are not. The LeDain Report describes the existing evidence, sum-
marizes conclusions of influential studies, suggests methodological
shortcomings, and assesses credibility. The Report notes that many
existing descriptions of the deleterious effects of chronic, heavy can-
nabis use are based on information collected without ordinary scien-
tific controls and from subjects who were illiterate, impoverished dere-
licts. The unrepresentative nature of such samples, the Report con-
tends, makes information derived from them virtually worthless.01
The Shafer Report, on the other hand, relies on those same discredited
studies to argue the risks of cannabis use.32
The risks are not to society, but only to the individual user. Thus
the primary question concerning cannabis use is not the nature of
danger involved, but whether individual use ought to be a criminal
offense. The starting point for all thoughtful students of this problem
is, or ought to be, John Stuart Mill's contention in On Liberty:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self protection .... The only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 3
29. SHAFER REPORT 87.
30. LEDAIN REPORT 97-99.
31. LEDAIN REPORT 68-74.
32. SHAFER REPORT 41, 52, 55, 65, 66.
33. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (C. Shields ed. 1956).
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Every serious consideration of cannabis laws since the East Indian
Hemp Report has endorsed Mill's thesis. But not one has been able
to show convincingly that criminalization of cannabis is justified by
the state's right to "self protection" or that society can "rightfully"
deter "any member of a civilized community, against his will" from
cannabis use because such use will cause "harm to others."
The LeDain Report fairly states Mill's position and analogizes the
cannabis controversy to the alcohol prohibition debate for purposes of
deriving the appropriate libertarian position. Mill opposed prohibition
of alcohol but noted that society may regulate sales primarily to protect
juveniles from their own bad judgment. The LeDain Report suggests
that Mill would have favored regulating cannabis distribution for the
same reason, but notes that Mill apparently does not consider impair-
ment of a person's usefulness to society a sufficient pretext for sanc-
tions against the cause of the impairment. 34 Having thus touched upon
libertarian principle, however, the Report undercuts itself by con-
tending that Mill proposed only a balancing test between personal
preferences and society's estimate of the danger such preferences pose
to the state. The LeDain Report suggests that Mill differs with his
critics in their advocacy of regulating purely individual conductP5
not on grounds of principle but on the factual question of extent of
risk. Because it gives society's interest in generally acceptable behavior
undue weight in the judgmental balance, the Report reduces to incon-
sequence the basic libertarian notion that individual conduct harmless
to others is not for society to proscribe.
In attempting to establish the danger cannabis use poses to society,
the LeDain Report first notes that the debate over cannabis laws re-
flects a cultural conflict between two sets of disharmonious values:
those associated with modem industrial society, including competi-
tiveness, acquisitiveness, and ambition, and those associated with that
society's critics, including cooperativeness, willingness to share, and
satisfaction with simpler pleasures. 30 The two sets cannot co-exist, the
34. LEDAIN REPORT 279.
35. See J. STEPHEN, LIBETY, EQUALry, F LTms.Nrr (1872); P. Dmu.iN, TiHt ENFOtCE-
MENT OF MORALS (1959).
36. There is a widespread feeling that certain kinds of drug use adversely affect
certain qualities which have played an important part in the development and func-
tioning of our present society: aggressivity, competitiveness, acquisitiveness, goal-
orientation, the willingness to defer present pleasure for future rewards, and the
capacity to tolerate the tedium of routine tasks, particularly those requiring pains.
taking attention to detail. Those who are critical of modem industrial society . . .
reply that it will be a good thing in the end if the old %alues and attitudes are
undermined and replaced by new ones, less aggressive, less competitihe, more co-
operative, less activist, more contemplative, less materialistic and acquisitive, more
oriented towards simplicity in demand and pleasure, less dependent on things, and
more able to enjoy the simple pleasure of being human in the natural environment.
LF-DAIN REPORT 273-74.
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Report implies, because the ethos of cannabis use threatens the "values
and attitudes" of "modem industrial society." 37 The Report apparent-
ly assumes that because cannabis use might "adversely affect"' , the
work ethic, the drug can properly be proscribed. Thus Mill's require-
ment that society violate individual liberty only to prevent "harm
to others"3 9 is facilely satisfied by defining "harm" to include threats
to the values of the majority. Mill would surely be startled by such an
understanding of his notions of "self protection" and prevention of
"harm to others."
The LeDain Report's inadequate treatment of Mill is profound
compared to the Shafer Report's cavalier discussion of the same prob-
lem. The latter Report merely gestures toward Mill's position:
Society may interfere with individual conduct only in the public
interest, using coercive measures only when less restrictive meas-
ures would not suffice .... And we must recognize ... the strong
conflicting notions of what constitutes the public interest.40
Conflicting notions notwithstanding, the Report concludes after very
little discussion that the unfounded fears of the majority-fifty percent
of American adults believe cannabis use is criminogenic and seventy
percent believe it leads to heroin use41-should continue to be mani-
fested in the criminal law.42
While the LeDain Report's treatment of the libertarian ideal con-
veys at least the appearance of sympathy, the two reports share the
fundamentally antilibertarian conclusion that the criminal law can
legitimately reflect the moral attitudes, no matter how irrational, of
the majority.
Though the reports do not advocate legalization of cannabis use,
neither do they support severe criminal penalties. Special concern
about the effect of cannabis on adolescents led the LeDain Report
to conclude that cannabis use should be discouraged. 43 Since enforce-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 273-74.
39. See p. 1740 supra.
40. SHAFrR REPORT 24-25.
41. Id. at 121.
42. The Report proffers a broad rationale for the regulation of cannabis:
The social policy planner is concerned not about the effects on the individual per
se, but about the impact of any adverse effect on his behavior and on the larger
society and about the bearing of his behavior on the larger social perspective.
Id. at 28.
45. The LeDain Report bases its recommendations upon remaining unresolved qucs.
tions of cannabis' effects on adolescent emotional development, automobile driving, men-
tal health, and multi-drug use. The Report admits there is no experimental evidence that
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ment of possession laws is impossible without inordinate policing costs,
the Commission suggests proscription only of trafficking with reduced
penalties. 44 The Shafer Report echoes its Canadian counterpart in this
recommendation. 45
President Nixon's forewarning that he would pay no heed to a
recommendation favoring legalization4" no doubt inhibited Shafer
Commission members who might have favored a bolder approach.
John H. Munro, Canadian Minister of.Health, also rejected the recom-
mendations of his country's commission, 47 but at least he waited until
the LeDain Report was completed.
The recommendations of both reports should in any case sink into
well-earned oblivion. The data compiled in the LeDain Report, how-
ever, will aid cannabis research and debate for years to come. That
is perhaps the most one could hope for from a government commission
report.
Indeed the two reports could only attain limited importance be-
cause they approached the subject incorrectly. Had they posed the
central question as "Should cannabis be criminalized?" rather than
"Should it be legalized?", their own findings would have argued-as
does use by 24 million Americans and 1.5 million Canadians-for a
negative answer to the former question. Fears for the stability of social
structure, however, prevented the reports from reaching an affirmative
answer to the latter question.
The proper analogy may be to the American prohibition experience
of the 1930's.4 8 The United States was unable to prohibit successfully
alcohol consumption,49 even though a majority had agreed through
its elected representatives to criminalize the drug. The minority was
too large and was insistent upon maintaining its drinking preferences.
Successful policing of cannabis laws is similarly impossible. Occasional
enforcement of the laws still muffles the protests of cannabis users,
cannabis use adversely affects adolescent maturation or that cannabis has been a sig-
nificant cause of automobile accidents. It acknowledges that its concern about adverse
effects on mental health and automobile driving are based on evidence of questionable
reliability. LEDAIN REPORT 26-72.
44. Id. at 302.
45. SHk'ER REPORT 192.
46. Quoted in R. KING, TiE DRUG HANG-UP 101 (1972).
47. N.Y. Times, August 1, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
48. See p. 1741 supra.
49. Recent analyses of America's drug problem have begun to focus on alcohol as
America's most worrisome recreational drug. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MAIUIIANA
AND DRUG ABUSE, DRUG UsE IN AMERICA-PROBL IN PEsP'rcvE 143 (1973): "Alcohol
is without question the most serious drug problem in this country today." See CoN.
SUo.RS UNION REPORT, supra note 3, at 260-64.
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despite their increasing numbers. Persistent, though dubious, fears
that legalized cannabis would seriously threaten social stability still
suffice to support a repression of individual liberty. But continued
increase in cannabis use will ineluctably result in the eventual legali-
zation of the drug. A chorus of respectable authorities, including the
American Bar Association ° and the Consumers Union,"' have al-
ready urged abolition or a severe narrowing of the cannabis proscrip-
tion. The North American cannabis reports could have been impor-
tant new voices singing this refrain. Instead, both spoke more for the
cause of repression than individual liberty.
50. N.Y. Times, August 18, 1972, at 10, col. 4.
51. CONSUMERS UNION REPORT 528-39.
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